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Abstract 
Legal capacity is one of the major topics in Islamic law on personal 
status. The Qurʾān deals with this subject, for example in Q 4: 5-6. However, 
it only discusses the issue of legal capacity in relation to orphans and minors. 
Based on the loose Qurʾānic concept of orphans and minors, the jurists of the 
classical period attempted to understand what was meant by legal capacity in 
Islam and how ought to operate in a Muslim society. One of the most 
remarkable jurists who tackled this issue was Ibn Rushd (520/1126-595-1198). 
In his celebrated collection of fatwā, the Fatāwā ibn Rushd, he explored the 
issue of legal capacity based on questions brought to him, who at a time sit as 
a qāḍī in Sevilla and Cordoba.  
Keywords: Averroes, legal capacity, personal status, guardianship, Muslim 
Spain. 
A. Introduction
Abu al-Walīd Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Muḥammad Ibn Rushd al-
Qurṭubi al-Mālikī, known in the Medieval West by the Latinized name of 
Averroes, is famous in modern academia as a master of natural sciences 
(physics, medicine, biology, astronomy), theology, and philosophy. He was 
born in Cordova in 520/1126 and died in Marrākush in 595/1198. His 
significant commentaries on Plato and Aristotle have led modern scholars to 
designate him as “the commentator of Aristotle.” 2  His stunning career in 
philosophy, natural sciences and theology, however, did not lead him to 
approach philosophy and religion as two distinct domains. On the contrary, 
Ibn Rushd was a Muslim thinker who advocated the importance of philosophy 
in acquiring an understanding of the world, relationships between individuals, 
and the structure of society. Ibn Rushd certainly was aware that there was a 
huge gulf between theoretical issues of theology and philosophy on one hand, 
and the practical issues of law on the other. In fact, in some of his 
commentaries, Ibn Rushd seems active in harmonizing philosophy and 
religion, or more specifically, in blending moral society into the sharīʿa.3 Yet, 
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it is on this latter issue that Ibn Rushd has been overlooked by modern 
scholars. Hence, serious attempts to look at his legal discourse are highly 
significant for the study of Islamic legal history as well as the study of law and 
society today.  
Insofar as the issue of Ibn Rushd’s legal discourse and career is 
concerned, there has only been three serious works written to date: 
Brunschvig’s “Averroès Juriste,” published four decades ago; Dominique 
Urvoy’s monograph, which contains some discussion of Ibn Rushd’s career as 
a jurist; and an unpublished 1991 doctoral thesis by Asadullah Yate from 
Cambridge University, which highlights Ibn Rushd career as a jurist in the 
Mālikī school of law.4 Although Ibn Rushd has written volumes on uṣūl, and 
was himself an appointed qāḍī in Seville and Cordoba, his treatises on legal 
discourse remain nearly unnoticed in academia because of the propensity of 
scholars to study his works on philosophy and theology.5 The indifference of 
modern scholars toward Ibn Rushd’s discussion of Islamic law may have a 
direct correlation with the modern scholars’ lack of interest in studying the 
legal history of the Muslims in Spain.  
Regardless of this paucity, historical records have sufficiently confirmed 
that Ibn Rushd was an expert not only in philosophy and theology (kalām), but 
also in interpreting God’s law. We are told that during his peak position as 
state-appointed qāḍī, he enjoyed the position the most learned man in Andalus. 
His legal works, Bidāyat al-mujtahid wa nihāyat al-muqtaṣid and the fatwa 
collection known as the Fatāwā Ibn Rushd, are masterpiece that became the 
subject of study and memorization among students of Islamic law. These two 
attest that Ibn Rushd was not only a speculative thinker, but also a jurist, and 
to some extent, a mujtahid within the Māikī school of law, who was very 
concerned with the practical needs of his society.6 
In this article, I attempt to bridge the gap between the much-studied 
aspects of his philosophical and theological thought and the unelaborated 
aspects of his juristic career in the Mālikī school of law, as well as to explore 
the issue of legal capacity as it pertained to the Muslims of Andalus. 
 
B. A brief history of Muslim in Spain  
Before we move on, it is worthwhile to briefly look at Ibn Rushd’s 
historical context in Medieval Spain. Muslims of Andalus are a mosaic of 
Muslim umma that have a different historical foundation from the rest of the 
Eastern Muslim community. What is interesting here is that despite the 
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Muslims of Spain experienced many conflicts and were faced with continuous 
anti-Islamic forces, they remained loyal to the Mālikī school of law 
(madhhab). Some scholars argue that the option to be loyal to ‘the people of 
Medina’ was chosen because of the straightforward theoretical solutions to 
social problems offered by Mālikī’s doctrine.7 Historical records, however, 
show that the allegiance of the Muslims in Spain to the Mālikī school was 
more pragmatic in nature: the Mālikī school was chosen by the Ummayyad 
dynasty in a bid to gain support from the ʿulamāʾ for the newly established 
caliphate. In this case, there are copious historical records on the arrival of 
Muslims in Andalus, especially from the early conquest of the Iberian 
Peninsula under the Umayyad caliph in Syria, al-Walīd. One record claims 
that the conquered were led by the governor of Ifriqiyya Mūsā b. Nuṣayr and 
his military commander, Ṭāriq. Following the political turbulence in 
Damascus and the threat of persecution of the Abbasid, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān the 
successor of al-Walīd escaped Syria to the peninsula and established an 
Umayyad caliphate there.8 
When ʿAbd al-Raḥmān I established an independent government in 
Cordoba on May 15, 756, he knew that his political authority was not as strong 
as the political authority of the Abbasid caliphate in Baghdad. Therefore, in 
order to ensure the continuity of his command in the peninsula, ʿAbd al-
Raḥmān needed full support not only from the Umayyad clients (mawālī banī 
Umayya) and the Islamized Barber, but also from the class of learned Muslims. 
That is to say, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān wanted to gain the ʿulamāʾ’s legitimacy for 
the newly-created state, because he recognized that only the ʿulamāʾ, who had 
direct influence on the masses, could assure him that his justice and attachment 
to the faith would be respected.9 Furthermore, the policy of aligning power 
with the ʿ ulamāʾ, or to use their moral standard in legitimizng the government, 
found it finest form during the time of Hishām I, the successor of ʿAbd al-
Raḥmān I, whose interest in fiqh led him to befriend the pupils of Mālik b. 
Anas, such as ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. al-Qāsim and the aṣḥāb of Ibn ʿAbd al-
ʿAzīz.10 
In the Abbasid context in the East, it is generally known that during 
Harun al-Rashīd, the disciples of Mālik in Baghdad and Medina desired the 
teaching of their master to be the official rite of the state. However, Mālik 
himself was reluctant to support the caliph because of his policy toward the 
Alīds, whom the people of Medina held in high esteem. The denunciation of 
Mālik’s involvement in caliph administration, nonetheless, did not obliterate 
the desire of his students to use his teachings as official law. When the ruler 
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of the West offered a way to realize Mālik’s standard of behavior and 
jurisprudence as official rite of the people of Andalus, the pupil of Mālik 
readily accepted the offer. In other words, the establishment of Mālik juristic 
discourse in Andalus was made possible because of the ruler’s interest in 
gaining the support of the ʿulamāʾ, as well as the ʿulamāʾ’s desire to apply 
their concept of ideal society and jurisprudence within the Umayyad state. 
However, we must bear in mind that the development of Mālik doctrine in 
Andalus was not without problems. Before being overruled by Mālik’s 
disciples, Andalus had previously opted for the doctrine of the Syrian jurist al-
Awzāʿī. The competition between al-Awzāʿī and Mālik eventually came to an 
end after the former died in 157/774, and that legal problem could no longer 
be referred to him. Mālik, on the other hand, only died after 179/795.11 
 
1. Legal Capacity in Islamic Law 
In his book An Introduction to Islamic Law (1982), Joseph Schacht 
suggests that legal capacity in Islamic law begins with birth and ends with 
death. Following this reasoning, the child or even the unborn child has the 
capacity to inherit, or in the case of a slave, she/he can be manumitted, but 
she/he would never have the capacity to dispose of his/her wealth or have the 
ability to contract unless they fulfilled certain conditions. Schacht has also 
distinguished two elements of legal capacity: the capacity of obligation 
(ahliyyat al-wujūb), which means the capacity to acquire rights and duties; and 
the capacity of execution (ahliyyat al-adā’), which includes the capacity to 
contract, and to fulfill one’s obligation.12 
However, to gain full legal capacity, a Muslim man or a woman must 
first fulfill certain conditions. Schacht explains that several prerequisites must 
be met before one is considered having full legal capacity: sanity (ʿāqil) and 
being of age (bāligh); he must also be fully responsible (mukallaf).13 The 
insane (majnūn), small children (ṭifl), the idiot (maʿtūh), and the minor (ṣabī, 
ṣaghīr)are considered wholly incapable, but can incur certain financial 
obligations. They also have the capacity to conclude purely advantageous 
transactions and accept donations and charitable gifts.14 
In addition to these conditions identified by Schacht, another important 
requirement that is no less significant in the discussion of legal capacity is the 
condition of safah. Ibn Manẓūr al-Ifrīqī, in his celebrated Lisān al-ʿArab, 
mentions the wide usage of the term safah in diverse contexts relating to 
ignorance (jahl), shallowness (khiffa), and lack of responsibility and 
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understanding (naqṣ al-ʿaql).15 Due to a possible broad interpretation, Muslim 
scholars since the early centuries of Islam have offered different opinions on 
the definition of who are the irresponsible or the ignorant (al-safīh). They have 
not reached a consensus on determining what the legal implications would be 
for someone who is considered al-safīh. Saʿid b. Jubayr was of the opinion 
that al-safīh (plural al-sufahāʾ) are orphans.16 Similarly, Saḥnūn mentioned 
that minors, whether orphans or not, also fall in the category of al-safīh.17 
Other scholars claim that women are al-sufahāʾ.18 A more specific reference 
to safah was made by Ibn Ḥazam, a former Shāfiʿī jurist who then became an 
independent-minded follower of the Ẓāhirī school of law in Andalus. He was 
of the opinion that al-safīh refers to ‘bad languages,’ ‘the obstinate infidel,’ 
and ‘the minor or insane.’19 
Ibn Rushd, on the other hand, employs the term safah in the narrow 
context of financial mismanagement, particularly referring to someone who is 
irresponsible and undervalues his own wealth. 20  Based on the Qur’anic 
passage Q 4:5; “Do not give the wealth which God granted you in support to 
the responsible (al-sufahāʾ); feed them from it and cloth them, and speak to 
them in good parlance,” Ibn Rushd believes this implies that a man or woman 
who has reached majority (bulūgh) can be regarded as a safīh if he/she is found 
financially irresponsible or is a spendthrift (mubadhdhir).21 
 
2. Legal Capacity in Ibn Rushd’s view 
In the anthology of fatwā collected by Mukhtār b. al-Ṭāhir al-Talīlī, Ibn 
Rushd does not explicitly mention legal capacity as an operative term in his 
corpus of Islamic law as Schacht has defined.22 However, the absence of this 
term by no means reduces his concern for discussing the issue of legal capacity 
in a comprehensive way. With no abstract operative term to be defined, Ibn 
Rushd goes on to discuss the topic of legal capacity by pointing out on 
particular cases. As is his general pattern, before explaining his fatwā, Ibn 
Rushd always begins his discussion with questions, which were either directly 
brought to him or had been addressed by other jurist. In the following 
discussion of legal capacity, Ibn Rushd begins his fatwā by responding to the 
general concern surrounding the circumstances in which a person is to be 
allowed (jawwaza) to dispose of his/her wealth.  
 
For Ibn Rushd, an individual has to reach certain points before he/she 
has the legal capacity to use his/her money (lā yaṣiḥ li al-insāni fī mā lahu illa 
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bi ʿarbaʿa awṣāf):  he/she must have reached puberty or maturity (al-bulūgh), 
must be free (al-ḥuriya),  as well as sound of mind (kamāl al-ʿaql) and has 
exhibited responsible behavior (bulūgh al-rashid).23 
Regarding the status of freedom (al-ḥuriya), Ibn Rushd refers to the 
status of slaves and their relationships to their master. In Islamic law, it is a 
legal fact that a slave is usually considered an object subject to his master.  
However, as Schacht has brought up, a slave is still to be considered a person, 
and therefore can be a possessor of rights: she/he can get married (the male 
slave can marry up to two female slaves).24 Ibn Rushd, in this case, does not 
provide further explanation as to the slave’s capacity in marriage. For Ibn 
Rushd, a slave has neither the legal capacity to dispose of his wealth nor the 
right to use and enjoy the advantages or profits of another’s property 
(usufruct); if he is involved in a transaction, his decision will be considered 
void ab initio.25 
Ibn Rushd’s explanation of bulūgh al-rashid, on the other hand, covers 
extensively men and women of different ages. In defining and supporting this 
idea, the philosopher uses the Qurʾān as a moral and legal source. He states 
that every person has a moral obligation to spend his money in accordance 
with the tenets of Islam. God forbids a Muslim to squander his wealth. If 
necessary, God advises Muslims to assign a guardian to protect the wealth 
(māl) of orphans.26 It is undoubtedly from these Qur’anic passages that Ibn 
Rushd builds his binary opposition between safah and rushd, a concept central 
to his discussion on legal capacity.  
 
Categories of maturity (bulūgh) 
In his collection fatwa, Ibn Rushd gives detailed accounts of when a free 
man or woman is to be considered mature (bulūgh). For a man to be considered 
mature or an adult, he must have experienced the emission of semen, and for 
a woman, she must have experienced her first menstruation. However, both 
men and women can be considered mature, though they have not yet 
experience the emission of semen or menstruation, if they have shown signs 
of maturity (beard and mustache in case of men) or have reached certain 
ages.27 
Certainly, Muslim jurists have never been in agreement in their 
discussion as to what age someone who has not experienced the emission of 
semen or menstruation is be considered mature. Ibn Rushd firmly 
acknowledges this fact and he restates that jurists offer different opinions 
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regarding age; some mark out the limit of maturity as fourteen years old, others 
fifteen years old, while others claim seventeen or eighteens years old.28 
Likewise, there has also been disagreements among Muslim jurists in 
answering this question: what would be the status of someone who has reached 
the minimum age, but has not dreamed yet and has no sign of maturity such as 
a beard? Would he be considered mature? In his response to this question, Ibn 
Rushd mentions that some jurists would consider the person mature because 
he has reached a certain age, while others would answer in the negative since 
there has been no sign as to whether the person would be a good person or not. 
To bridge these two positions, Ibn Rushd suggests that we should ask the 
person whether he has experienced any other signs of maturity or not. Her/his 
answer would be our basis for determining whether he/she has matured or 
not.29 
As regard to the definition of a healthy mind (ʿaql), the exact scope is 
plain and straightforward: she/he must be able to recognize the difference 
between a beast (al-bahīma) and an insane person (al-majnūn), recognize that 
the quantity of two is greater than one, or to acknowledge the indisputable fact 
that the sky is above us (al-samāʾ fawqanā) and the earth is under us (al-arḍ 
taḥtanā).30 
 
Relationship between maturity (bulūgh) and responsible behavior (bulūgh al-
rashid) 
Although Ibn Rushd defines the boundaries of maturity (bulūgh), he 
does not give any detailed explanation as to whether someone who is 
considered mature would have the ability to act in a responsible way (bulūgh 
al-rashid) and would not be considered a spendthrift (al-safīh). However, he 
offers a simple way of determining the mature capacity of an individual, that 
is, by looking at the manner in which he spends his wealth; whether it is in 
accordance with the moral basis revealed by the Qurʾān 4:6 or not. The Qurʾān 
says: “And test the orphans until they attain the age of marriage; then if they 
show responsible behavior, give them their goods.” Furthermore, Ibn Rushd 
explains in detail that there were four ways (aqsām) of determining if someone 
has the ability to act in responsible way (bulūgh al-rashid):  
 
i. If a person is generally known to have the capacity or the potential to use 
his wealth in an extravagant and irresponsible way, then he should not be 
considered responsible and therefore should be legally treated in 
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accordance with his behavior (ḥāl al-aghlabu min ṣāḥibihā al-safah 
fayaḥkumu lahu fīhā biḥukmuhu).31 
ii. If a person is known to be responsible, and will most likely continue to be 
responsible in spending his wealth, then he should be legally considered 
as behaving responsibly (wa in ẓahara rashadahu, wa ḥāl al-aghlabu min 
ṣāḥibihā al-rashad fayaḥkumu lahu fīhā biḥukmuhu).32 
iii. If a person had previously been known to be capable of extravagance and 
irresponsibility in the use of his wealth, but it had not yet been formally 
determined whether he was responsible or not, and it is subsequently 
found that he is negligent in his actions, then he should be legally defined 
as irresponsible (wa in ʿalama sufuhahu, wa hāl muḥtamalah li al-rashad 
wa al-safahu, wa al-aẓharu fīhā al-safah fayaḥkumu lahu fīhā biḥukmuhu 
mā lam yaẓhuru rashaduhu).33 
iv. The fourth category of persons is similar to the previous one, only he is 
not negligent in the use of his wealth.  He should therefore be legally 
determined as being responsible or accountable (wa ḥāl muḥtamalatu 
ayḍan li al-rashad wa al-safahu, wa illā ẓaharu min ṣaḥibihā  al-rashad 
fayaḥkumu lahu bihi mā lam yaẓhuru safahu).34 
In addition to the four categories discussed above, Ibn Rushd adds 
another specific category regarding a person who is deemed irresponsible:  if 
he has not yet matured (al-ṣaghīr), then he cannot be considered responsible. 
In this case, Ibn Rushd explains that there was no dispute between Mālik and 
his associates about the legal rights of this person; if the person has not 
dreamed and experienced the emission of semen (man) or menstruation 
(woman), the person is not legally allowed to rule over his own wealth. He 
does not have the legal capacity to donate his wealth (hibah), give to charity 
(ṣadaqah) and or make any financial contracts.35 
 
3. Legal capacity of women   
The discussion of the legal capacity of women consists of many details 
that would not be found in a discussion on the legal capacity of men. The 
following situations would not allow a woman to have legal capacity to act in 
her own name: a woman who has not yet experienced sexual intercourse (al-
bakara), a woman still under the control of her father or a guardian, a woman 
who has not yet reached menopause (taʾnas) according to the opinion of the 
madhhab from which we derive the limits of menopause,36 a woman who has 
not yet married, or a woman who is married but the marriage has not yet been 
consummated. Her competence in controlling her wealth and any other acts 
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that have legal consequences would thus be contingent on her father or her 
legal guardian.37 
Once she reaches maturity, a woman under guardianship is required to 
show how she plans to spend her wealth. If the community finds that she has 
been responsible in her decision, she will be considered as having full legal 
capacity.38 On the contrary, if the community finds that she is a spendthrift, 
she will be judged as having been irresponsible in her actions and therefore 
would not be accorded legal capacity. However, this order would not be the 
same for a virgin whose father has died and has not assigned her a guardian. 
In such a case, Ibn Rushd explains that there has been no consensus on such a 
situation among Mālik’s associates (aṣḥāb).39 
Nevertheless, in the cases of a virgin who has not yet been judged 
responsible or not, or of a woman who has reached maturity, or of a woman 
who has married but has not been living with her husband according to the 
minimum period of time as derived from the opinion of madhhab, her legal 
capacity to contract or to act in other financial situations would be contingent 
on her father or her husband.40 
As for a woman who has been considered responsible and has never been 
a spendthrift, or a virgin who has reached menopause according to the opinion 
of the madhhab from which we derive the limits of menopause, Ibn Rushd 
offers two opinions: (i) if her father or guardian claims that she is not 
responsible, then she would not have the legal capacity to act in any financial 
and non financial contracts; these decisions would remain contingent of her 
father or guardian; (ii) if she is married and has had sexual intercourse  with 
her husband, then she should be considered as having full legal capacity.41 
 
4. Legal capacity of menopause woman 
It is generally agreed upon that a virgin who has not yet experienced her 
first menstruations cannot be considered as having full legal capacity, unless 
she has reached the age of maturity. However, in some conditions, a 
menopausal woman (taʾnas) can have legal capacity and be permitted to act 
on her own behalf. Although there has been some disagreement among 
Muslim jurists as to when a woman can be considered menopausal, Ibn Rushd 
tries to present the conditions in three categories: 
a. If she has a father 
 
“Ibn Rushd as Jurist” And 
His Fatwā on Legal 
Capacity 
Fachrizal A. Halim 
45 
The legal status of a woman who lives under the protection of her father 
until her marriage, and whose husband has consummated the marriage, is 
determined by the husband. If her husband knows that she would be 
responsible in her actions, then she can get out from under her father’s guard 
and be considered mature and responsible. She will also be legally permitted 
to spend her wealth. Conversely, if her husband finds that she has been 
irresponsible in her use of wealth, she will not be considered mature. Similarly, 
a woman who is living with her father, is married and whose husband has 
consummated the marriage, but has not reached menopause, and has never 
been a spendthrift, could be considered mature and responsible.42 
In determining the minimum age of menopause (taʾnas), Ibn Rushd 
notes that there has been no agreement among Muslim jurists. While some say 
forty years old, others set the minimum age at fifty or sixty years old. The 
opinion of Mālik, however, was that if she remained with her father, her 
actions would not be considered valid without her father’s consent, unless she 
has reached the age of menopause.43 
The following discussion will be more complex as we look at the 
situation of a woman who is living with her father and has been married for 
less than one year. In such a case, Ibn Rushd is of the opinion that the legal 
status of the woman to act on her own is withheld for one year to three years, 
depending on the jurist, before she can be considered mature and responsible. 
During this interim period, she will not be permitted to engage in any 
transaction or contract. Decisions made during this waiting time can be 
revoked. Only after this period has passed can she obtain legal capacity. In 
addition, she is also required to show that she is capable of responsible 
behavior, thus proving maturity and responsibility.44 
In the case of a woman whose husband has died before the one, two or 
three-year anniversary, depending on which timeframe is considered valid, Ibn 
Rushd offers two opinions: first, if she has married, regardless of the length of 
marriage, she will be considered fully capable in all her decision; second, if 
she has married and her husband dies, she must return to her father if her father 
is still alive.45 
 
b. If her father had assigned a guardian prior to his death 
The legal capacity of a woman whose father had assigned her a guardian 
before his death, since she was known to be extravagant and irresponsible in 
spending his wealth, or in the case of a court assigning her a guardian after the 
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death of her father, remains with her guardian. Even if she has married and is 
accompanied by her husband, her guardian retains control of her wealth, unless 
she has proven that she is responsible (rushd).46 
 
c. If she is an orphan 
In the case of an orphan - if she has a guardian assigned by her father or 
assigned by the court, or if she has been married for a long period of time and 
her husband has had sexual intercourse with her, or if she has reached 
menopause - she cannot release herself from her guardian unless the guardian 
release her. According to Ibn Rushd, this is a well known opinion among 
Mālikī jurists (hadhā huwa al-mashhūr fī al-madhhab). 47 The less popular 
opinion, however, according to Ibn Rushd, says that once she reaches 
menopause or marries, she should be allowed to free herself from her guardian 
and be permitted to act on her own behalf.48 
In the case of an orphan who has no guardian assigned to her by her 
father, Ibn Rushd offers two further opinions. The first, which is held by 
Saḥnūn, says that once she has reached maturity and experienced 
menstruation, her actions can be considered legitimate. The second, in 
contrast, posits that unless she has reached menopause (taʾnas), she will not 
considered as having legal capacity for any of her actions.49 
Jurists of the medieval period, as Ibn Rushd informs us, never reached a 
consensus as to what age a woman can be considered menopausal. Here, Ibn 
Rushd lists supplementary opinions: some jurists are said to believe that the 
period of menopause begins after thirty years of age, while others emphasized 
forty years, and some others gave a range of between fifty to sixty years. 
Another argument claims that regardless of her age, if she has been with her 
husband for one to three years, depending on which one we consider to be 
legitimate, then she can be regarded as in a similar position as a menopausal 
woman and therefore all her actions should be considered legal.50 
 
5. Legal capacity of man 
Unlike our previous discussion concerning the legal capacity of a 
woman, the legal capacity of a man is less complex.  Muslim jurists had come 
to an agreement that a young man who is not mature and is still under the 
protection of his father would not have the legal capacity to donate (hibah) or 
conclude any financial contract without his father’s consent. Once he has 
reached maturity, he may fall in one of three categories: First, if he is known 
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to be sound of mind and has been responsible in spending his wealth, then he 
should be considered responsible or rushd.51Second, if he is usually known to 
be extravagant in spending his wealth, and should he be determined to 
continue this behavior, then he is be considered irresponsible or safah.52Third, 
if it has not been determined whether he is responsible or extravagant, then 
there are two possibilities. In one case, an observation of his behavior will lead 
to a determination of whether he has been responsible for his wealth or not. 
This opinion, according to Ibn Rushd, is held by Yaḥyā, from Ibn al-Qāsim in 
his book al-Ṣadaqāt wa al-hibāt, who said that if the man has been responsible, 
he must be considered mature and should not remain under his father or 
guardian’s supervision, unless there is reason to believe otherwise.53 
The second opinion maintains that as long as the man has not been 
wasteful, he should be allowed to act alone in all of his transactions. If he is 
found to be excessive and irresponsible, then his father or guardian has the 
right to intervene. According to Ibn Rushd, this is the opinion of Mālik, which 
was reported by Ziyād, and has been clearly stated in the Mudawwana of 
Saḥnūn.54 
In the case of a man whose father has died, and who himself has not yet 
matured (bulūgh), but the court has assigned him a guardian, then the guardian 
will take on the role of his father. However, if he has reached maturity and has 
been responsible (rushd), who can release him from the guardian’s control? 
According to Ibn Zarab, if the guardian was assigned by qāḍī, then only the 
qāḍīhas the right to release him from the guardian.55 Some jurists are reported 
to have said that the man is permitted (jāʾiz) to release himself from his 
guardian once he has reach maturity, while others claim that the man should 
not be permitted to release himself from his guardian unless he has proven that 
he is responsible for his wealth.56 
If a father had assigned him a guardian before his death, Ibn Rushd, 
following Ibn al-Qāsim in his Kitāb al-wāṣiyā al-Ūla, says that he does not 
specifically need a qāḍī’s decision to release himself once he has matured and 
has been responsible in all his action. In the absence of a qāḍī’s decision, 
however, he still needs someone to release him from his guardian.57 
 
C. Interjection and relations between guardian and ward 
In the corpus of Islamic law, there has been massive debate over whether 
someone who is considered irresponsible, extravagant, or a spendthrift (al-
safīh) should be under interdiction or not.58 Al-Shāfiʿī, for example, in his 
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Kitāb al-Umm held the position that the irresponsible or the spendthrift, 
because of its similar ʿilla with the minor, should be interjected.59 Mālik and 
the two disciples of Abū Ḥanīfa, Abū Yūsuf and al-Shaybānī were also 
reported to have denied the rights of the safah to formalize contracts and 
buying or selling without the prior consent of his guardian.60 Abū Ḥanīfa, on 
the contrary, was reportedly against the decision to intervene the spendthrift 
because he considered the act of the interdiction or the denial of legal capacity 
as more harmful to the person than his own irresponsible acts.61 Ibn Rushd, 
however, as we have seen from the foregoing discussion, was on the side of 
Muslim jurists who supported the interjection. His fatwā on legal capacity and 
his discussion of the categories of the responsible and irresponsible in 
spending someone’s wealth reflect his strong position on interdiction and the 
necessity of assigning a guardian. 
In the following paragraph, I shall discuss how Ibn Rushd explains the 
relationship between a guardian and his ward, to what extend a guardian has a 
right to intervene in his ward’s activities, and what action can legally be taken 
by a ward without the prior consent of his guardian. 
Although the term safah has a broad meaning, as seen in the discussion 
on legal capacity, Ibn Rushd employed the term safah to refer to the Qur’anic 
competency of spending wealth. We have also noted that Ibn Rushd did not 
recognize any legal capacity to those he considered irresponsible, spendthrifts 
or any other related term of safah. However, Ibn Rushd emphasizes that in the 
case of rituals, someone who is considered safah has the same the capacity of 
obligationsuch as fasting and praying as someone who is considered mature, 
responsible, and in possession of a perfect mind (kamāl ʿaql and bulugh al-
rashid) except for the minor and the insane. He can also be punished (qiṣāṣ) if 
he commits a  wrong.62 
Beyond the issue of the Qur’anic morality of spending wealth, Ibn Rushd 
recognizes that someone who is considered safah, whether under guardianship 
or not, can still be allowed to engage in some legalactivities. In some cases of 
guardianship, the guardian may intervene him, although there has been no 
clear cut position on this legal question.  For example, a person who is 
considered safah still has the right to divorce (ṭalāq) his wife without the 
consent of his guardian, and his action will remain valid. Likewise, he also has 
the right to manumit a slave (‘ataqa).63 
However, in other cases, Ibn Rushd quoted Muḥammad Ibn al Mawāz 
as saying that if the person engages in activities that will result in any financial 
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consequences in his life, such as donations (hibah), charity (ṣadaqah), or even 
manumitment of a slave, (‘ataqa), he will have to ask permission from his 
guardian. This implies that the guardian will analyse whether his ward’s 
decision would significantly affect his life or not. If the guardian finds that his 
decision will negatively impact his life, the guardian can intervene him. 
Nevertheles, if the person  receives financial benefits from others, for example, 
a creditor forgives him his debt, he can legally accept it without the consent of 
his guardian.64 
In the case of divorce, due to the financial responsibility it may resulted 
in, Ibn Rushd mentions a significant difference among Muslim jurists on 
whether a safih is still responsible for the payment of his wife’s expenses. The 
first argument, held by Mālik, posits that although the person is considered a 
safih, he would never be discharged from his obligation to pay his due to his 
wife. On the contrary, the second argument holds that the husband is not 
responsible to pay his due because he is under the supervision of someone else. 
A third argument requires an analysis of the person’s financial situation.  If 
the person has the capacity to pay his due, he must pay. However, if he has 
very limited financial freedom, then he is not obliged to pay his due.65 Ibn 
Rushd indicates that the third argument has become the opinion of the majority 
of jurists. However, he does not explicitly mention which position he himself 
held.   
 The relationship between a guardian and his ward became more 
complex as the Cordoban qāḍī faced further marital issues. One case brought 
before him considered the following problem: what happens when a person, 
who is considered safah and has a guardian, has married a woman without the 
consent of his guardian and then dies? The question requiring his fatwā is how 
the guardian ought to consider the wife of his ward, who by law is allowed to 
inherit from her husband. In regards to this specific problem, Ibn Rushd offers 
three answers: the first says she does not inherit, unless she has had sexual 
relations with her husband; the second says she can undoubtedly inherit; and 
the third says that she has a right to inherit, but the guardian must look at the 
marital situation. That is to say, if the marriage was acceptable, she would be 
able inherit.66 
Another problematic case brought before Ibn Rushd was whether a 
guardian could force his ward to marry without the latter’s approval. Again, in 
answering this question, Ibn Rushd offers two answers: the first says that the 
guardian cannot force his ward to marry without his consent, and the second 
says the guardian can force his ward to marry regardless of the ward’s 
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consent.67 
Likewise, in the case of divorce between the person who is considered 
safah and his wife, similar questions were brought before him. Does a 
guardian have the right to divorce his ward’s wife? Again, Ibn Rushd does not 
specifically answer this question. One position claims that the guardian has 
the right to divorce his ward’s wife, but another insists that the guardian does 
not have such a right.68 
 
D. Conclusion and remarks 
After reading Ibn Rushd and his selected fatwā, we can gain some 
conclusion which may enrich our understanding of Ibn Rushd and his legal 
discourse. First, Ibn Rushd neither begins his discussion on legal capacity from 
an abstract idea, nor does he mention the term legal capacity in his selected fatwa. 
However, from the general concern surrounding the circumstances in which a 
person is to be allowed (jawwaza) to dispose of his/her wealth, he discusses the 
issue of legal capacity, and that discussion has included the capacity to acquire 
rights and duties and the capacity of execution as indicated by Schacht. 
It is also obvious that Ibn Rushd refers to the Qurʾān as the main source 
of his exploration of legal capacity. He has expanded the meaning of term safah, 
which the Qurʾān only uses to address the situation of minors and orphans, into a 
more general moral and legal concept of spending wealth. In this context, Ibn 
Rushd has created the binary opposition between safah and rushd. In order to 
define who is considered safah and rushd, Ibn Rushd, though not in any 
systematic order, has classified the capacity of men and women, as well as 
menopausal women.  Broadening the application of these two terms, safah and 
rushd, from orphans and minors to men and women in general, Ibn Rushd 
supports the idea of extending interjection and guardianship to anyone who is 
considered irresponsible.  
Second, it is interesting to note that although in some way Ibn Rushd does 
not specifically define his juristic position, he remains consistent with the standard 
teaching of Mālik and his associates. In some of his discussions on the legal 
capacity of women for example, he refers to the authority of Ibn al-Qāsim and 
Saḥnūn as the reliable source of the Mālikī school of law. On occasion, Ibn Rushd 
also mentions his agreement with the widely accepted opinion (mashhūr) in the 
madhhab, without specifically mentioning any authoritative names. In the case 
where Ibn Rushd does not explicitly mention his juristic position, he only offers 
various arguments within the Mālikī school of law and lets his readers to choose 
any legal position. In this case, Ibn Rushd provides room for disagreement 
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(ikhtilāf), which is highly beneficial for the survival and flexibility of Islamic legal 
concepts. 
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